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Kayman and Siegel: Non-Competes

A WAYWARD NOTION IN NEW YORK'S
COMMON LAW:
THE UNIQUE EMPLOYEE RATIONALE FOR
ENFORCING NON-COMPETES
Steven M. Kayinan and John Siegar
Although employee covenants not to compete are disfavored by
"powerful public policy considerations [that] militate against
enforcement of restrictive covenants,"' the New York Court of
Appeals has repeatedly noted that non-competes nevertheless "may
be enforceable where the employee's services were special or
unique."- Despite the frequent repetition of this dictum, the unique
employee rationale has almost never been invoked by New York
courts as the actual basis for enforcing a non-compete. Instead, in
nearly every New York case, enforcement has turned on whether
the restrictive covenant was necessary to protect the employer's
confidential information and, if that question was answered in the

*Steven M. Kayman chairs and John Siegal is a member of the NonCompete & Trade Secrets Practice Group at Proskauer Rose, LLP. This article
is expanded and reprinted with permission from the April 6, 1998 edition of the
New York Law Journal, Q1998 The New York Law Journal Publishing
Company. All rights reserved.
Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc., 166 Misc. 2d 481, 485, 633
N.Y.S.2d 926, 929 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995), aftd, 223 A.D.2d 516,
637 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1996) (citing Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg.
Co., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 499, 369 N.E.2d 4, 6, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 (1977); see
also Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245,
247, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1963) (noting courts have "displayed a much
stricter attitude with respect to covenants" that sanction "the loss of a man's
livelihood.").
2 American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 403 n.6,
420
N.E.2d 363,367 n.6, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482,486 n.6 (1981) (emphasis added) (citing
Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 308, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593,
386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976)); see also PurchasingAssocs., 13 N.Y.2d at 273,
196 N.E.2d at 248,246 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
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affirmative, an assessment of the reasonableness of the restraint as
to factors such as geography and duration.'
New York's unique employee rationale for non-compete cases,
a theory few other states recognize, was given new life by New
York Supreme Court Justice Herman Cahn, who sits in the
Commercial Division in Manhattan, in MTV Networks, Inc. v. Fox
Kids Worldwide, Inc.4 Justice Cahn barred Richard Cronin, the
President of MTV Network's "TV Land" and "Nick-at-Nite" cable
networks, from working for Fox Kids TV until the end of his
MTVN [hereinafter "MTVN] non-compete contract because,
among other reasons, he was a "unique employee with unique
skills and knowledge."' Given the continued articulation of the
unique employee rationale in New York non-compete cases,
Justice Cahn's decision was solidly grounded, and we believe it
was the correct result on the facts presented as well. We also
believe, however, that the unique employee rationale should be
disaffirmed, not re-invigorated, and that the court need not have
relied on it as a basis for its decision.
As the court expressly found in MTV v. Fox, the usual trade
secret analysis under New York non-compete law provided ample
basis for enjoining Cronin from working for the competition for
the six remaining months of his non-compete period.6 In addition,
Cronin's non-compete operated only during the term of his
3 See, e.g., H & R Recruiters, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 243 A.D.2d 680, 681, 663

N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (2d Dep't 1997) (quoting Howard Sys. Int'l., Inc. v. IMI
Sys., 192 A.D.2d 371, 373, 596 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (Ist Dep't 1993)) (enforcing
covenants only if "reasonably limited temporally and geographically ... and
then only to the extent necessary to protect the employer from unfair
competition which stems from the employee's use or disclosure of trade secrets
or confidential customer lists . . . ."); see also Cliff v. R.R.S. Inc., 207 A.D.2d
17, 19, 620 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192 (3rd Dep't 1994) (citing Mohawk Maintenance
Co. v. Kessler, 52 N.Y.2d 276, 283-84, 419 N.E.2d 324, 328, 437 N.Y.S.2d 646,
650 (1981) (further citations omitted) (noting that an express covenant ... will

be enforced if "'reasonable' in geographic scope and duration.").

4 1998 WL 57480 (Sup. Ct. New York County Feb. 4, 1998).

5 MTV v. Fox, 1998 WL 57480, at *6 (referring to Cronin as the "public

face" of MTVN representing the network at many public functions).
6 Id (noting that the testimony of top officials at MTVN established that
Cronin not only "had access to confidential information, especially in the area of
[the company's] plans for competing with ... Fox Kids," he also had "detailed
knowledge of MTVN's budget process.").
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employment agreement following his termination for cause for
accepting a job with Fox, not after the term of his employment
ended.7 This presented a different situation than the usual
employment covenant not to compete and surely influenced the
court's decision to enforce the non-compete. 8
Indeed, Cronin's covenant would have been enforced under the
laws of other states,9 nearly all of which are not saddled with New
York's unique employee rationale and instead appropriately seek
'"not to prevent the competitive use of the unique personal qualities
of the employee -

either during or after the employment

-

but to

prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or relationships
which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee
acquired in the course of the employment."'"

7 Id.

at *1. The non-compete clause in Cronin's employment contract
provided:
[Y]our employment hereunder is on an exclusive basis and
that during the shorter of (x) the period remaining in the
Employment Term on any given date and (y) one (1)
year after
the termination of your employment... you will not engage in
any other business activity which is in conflict with your
duties and obligations hereunder. You agree that during the
Non-Compete Period you shall not directly or indirectly
engage in or participate as an officer, employee, director,
agent of or consultant for any business directly competitive
with that of MTVN ....
Id.

8 Id. at *5 (explaining that this was not just an ordinary "non-compete" case
but rather it was a claim by MTVN "that Cronin should be held to the original
term of the agreement only."); cf American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Wolf. 52
N.Y.2d 394, 403, n. 6, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (1981)
(explaining "no New York case has been found where enforcement has been
granted following termination of the employment contract, solely on the basis of
the uniqueness of the services.").
9 See Solari Indust., Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. 1970) (further
citations omitted) (stating "[tihough noncompetitive agreements were at one
time flatly outlawed it is now well recognized that they do have a proper place
and are enforceable under appropriate circumstances" notably "where [they]
simply protect[ ] the legitimate interests of the employer, impose[ ] no undue
hardship on the employee, and [are] not injurious to the public.").
1oHarlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 625, 647 (1960) (referring to the application of the unique employee
rationale to covenants not to compete in employment agreements as "a natural
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The MTV v. Fox Decision
Richard Cronin was a long-time employee of MTV Networks."
He became a member of Nickelodeon's "executive team" in July
1987, and he inked a new three-year contract to serve as President
of the "TV Land" network, a new nostalgia programming service,
in July 1995.2 He also supervised the successful "Nick-at-Nite"
network. 3
In a description that would fit nearly any divisional president or
senior corporate executive, Justice Cahn summarized Cronin's
responsibilities as a member of the "executive team" by explaining
that "the 'executive team'

. . .

reviews operations, budgets and

strategic plans for the network."' Substantially all the operating
information and plans are made available to and considered by the
'executive team.""' 5 To this nearly generic description, Justice
Cahn added that "Cronin was also a spokesperson for Nick-at-Nite
and TV Land, filling the role of master of ceremonies for Nick-atNite and TV Land's annual 'up front' presentations to advertisers.
[MTVN's] witnesses testified that he was considered its 'public
face.""16

On the basis of these two factors, Cronin's knowledge of
MTVN's most closely-held business plans and his external role as
corporate spokesman and point-person with advertisers, Justice

confusion that arises from the analogy with restraints incident to sales [of
businesses]").

"MTV v. Fox, 1998 WL 57480, at *1. Cronin worked for MTVN since
1984, 13 years prior to the commencement of this action. Id.
12 Id.; see also Don Jeffrey, Viacom Sees Strong MTV Gains in 2nd
Quarter,

Billboards, Aug. 16, 1997, at 50 (discussing "nostalgia television channel TV
Land"); Frank Rose, The Love Song of E. Bronfman Jr. (Hollywood mogul),

Esquire, June 1, 1997, at 54 (noting that "TV Land [is] a nostaglia network.").
'3 MTV v. Fox, 1998 WL 57480, at * I (explaining that "Nick-at-Nite [was] a
sister network to TV Land specializing in 'classic' situation comedies.").
14 id

15 Id.

MId. at

6 (stating that Cronin represented MTVN at public presentations in
which the network presented "its plans and hopes for the coming seasons to
advertisers and media buyers in [an] attempt[ ] to sell advertising.").
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Cahn found that Cronin was a "unique" employee. 7 However, the
evidentiary basis for Justice Cahn's finding that Richard Cronin
was "unique" had little to do with any intrinsic qualities unique to
Cronin. Rather, it was "Cronin['s] . . . access to confidential
information, especially in the area of MTVN's plans for competing
with, among others, Fox Kids"' 8 that led Justice Calm to conclude
"that Cronin is a uniquely talented executive who..... was a key
player in setting goals and devising strategies for the network,
including ...methods of dealing with competitors, and
suggestions for seizing opportunities before competitors, expressly
including Fox Kids, [and who took] advantage of them."' 9
Justice Calm also found that, because Cronin was master of
ceremonies at "TV Land's" annual advertising presentation, he
was the network's unique "public face."'
This element of
uniqueness was likewise supported by evidence that predominantly
fit another of the bases recognized in most states, but usually not in
New York, for specifically enforcing non-competes - namely, the
need to protect the customer relationships and business contacts
that Cronin developed while employed by MTVN. " This evidence
included Cronin's role as the master of ceremonies at MTVN's "up
front" sales presentations, making him the network's key contact
with advertisers, advertising media buyers and cable systems
operators.' Justice Calm noted that the evidence also showed that
"[Cronin] had regular contact with the trade press, with whom he

7
1 Id. (stating that there ample evidence to find that Cronin qualified
as a
"unique employee" and thus was "subject to a restrictive covenant which may

otherwise be enforceable.").
'sId at *6.
19Id
20
Id"
21

See, e.g., Gale Peterson, Recent Developments in Trade Secret La'm in an

Information Age, 507 PRAC. L. INST. PAT. 441 (1998) (noting Illinois "ha[s]

developed a substantial body of law protecting customer relations); see also
Ellen M. Martin, Tracy E. Diamond, Workplace Claims: Wrongil Termination.
CollateralTorts, Privacy, Restrictions on Right to Compete, and Investigations,

571 PRAC. L. INST. LrrIG. 695 (1997) (stating that "New Jersey courts seem
somewhat more receptive to non-compete covenants than do New York
courts.").
22 MTVv. Fox, 1998 WL 57480, at *6.
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has excellent relations, and appeared at industry conventions
regularly, where personal relationships are invaluable."23
Surely, Cronin was a key figure at MTVN. But the evidence of
his crucial role was that he had custody of MTVN's most vital
trade secrets, which should have independently supported specific
enforcement of the non-compete without any finding that he was
unique.Aware of the trade secrets basis for specifically
enforcing Cronin's non-compete, Justice Cahn did not rest his
preliminary injunction solely on the ground that Cronin was a
unique employee. -5 Instead, he held that "[t]he evidence amply
demonstrate[d] that Cronin qualifies as a unique employee, and is
in possession of confidential information, and is, therefore, subject
to a restrictive
covenant which may otherwise
be
''6
[un]enforceable. 1
Other than reaching that conclusion, however, Justice Cahn
relied not on Cronin's uniqueness but on his possession of and
access to MTVN trade secret information that would permit Cronin
to unfairly compete with MTVN if he were to work for Fox during
the contractual non-compete period.27
This emphasis on unfair competition and misuse of trade secrets
was apparent from the outset of the litigation. Together with the
claim for breach of contract, MTVN's complaint contained causes
of action against Cronin for breach of fiduciary duty and
unauthorized use of trade secrets, and against Fox Kids and its
23 id.
24

1d. at *9 (stating there was much testimony concerning "Cronin's
possession of trade secrets and MTVN documents at his home while he was
negotiating with Fox Kids.").
251d. (noting

"[i]t is clear there are trade secrets which Cronin possesses, and

MTVN is entitled to have protected.").
26Id

at *6 (emphasis added) (citing Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc.,

166 Misc. 2d 481, 484, 633 N.Y.S.2d 926, 929 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995), affd, 223 A.D.2d 516, 637 N.Y.S.2d I10 (1st Dep't 1996).
271d at * i. The term of Cronin's MTVN non-compete was co-terminous
with the term of his employment contract through June 1998. Id. That contract
was terminated when he signed a contract with Fox in October 1997, and much

of the dispute turned on whether MTVN terminated Cronin for cause or rather,
as he and Fox claimed, he was not properly terminated for cause and therefore

had grounds for resigning. Id. at *3-4. The non-compete issue was whether
Cronin could work for Fox before July 1998, not whether he would continue
working for MTVN. Id. at * 1.
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parent, News Corporation, for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contract and unfair
competition.'8 Justice Calm's analysis of the case reflected the
emphasis of MTVN's complaint:
It is clear that there are trade secrets which Cronin possesses, and
MTVN is entitled to have protected. It is true that much of such
confidential information is eventually released to the public
through the media and trade publications. In that sense, the cable
television industry does not have trade secrets akin to formulas
and models held secret indefinitely. Yet until strategic plans and
budgeting, etc.
are implemented or released to the public, they are
29
trade secrets.
So, given the emphasis on trade secrets as a basis for
specifically enforcing Cronin's non-compete, why did the court
venture into the murky waters of whether Cronin was a unique
employee? What makes one business executive unique when
another is not? And why should "unique" employees be more
readily enjoined from competing than "ordinary" employees? The
answers are buried deep in New York's common law governing
employee non-compete agreements.
The Roots of the Unique Employee Rationale
While often noting in dicta that "injunctive relief may be
available where an employee's services are unique or extraordinary
and the covenant is reasonable," ' the New York Court of Appeals
has never approved specific performance of a non-compete on that
basis, although lower state courts and federal courts applying New
York law do invoke the unique employee rationale on occasion
when enforcing post-employment non-competition covenants.'
2

1ld. at *5.

29

1d.at

30 Reed,

*9.

Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 303, 308 N.E.2d 590.

593, 386 N.Y.S. 677, 680 (1976); see also American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v.
Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394,403 n.6, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367 n.6, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482,487
n.6 3(1981)
(emphasis added).
1
See, e.g., Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 709, 729 n. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Columbia Ribbon &
Carbon Mfg. Co., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 499, 369 N.E.2d 4, 6, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1004,
1006-07 (1977)) (enforcing restrictive covenant even though no trade secrets
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The oft-cited, but rarely followed unique employee rationale
appears to have arrived in court of appeals jurisprudence
concerning non-compete agreements in the 1910 case, McCall Co.
v. Wright.32 During a lengthy discussion in that decision of cases
decided by the Appellate Division, First Department, mostly
concerning musical and theatrical performers," the New York
were involved when employee's "services [were] truly 'special, unique or
extraordinary and not merely of high value to his employer."'); see also
Contempo Communications, Inc. v. MJM Creative Servs., Inc., 182 A.D.2d 351,
354, 582 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669 (1st Dep't 1992) (citing Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303,
308, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976) (upholding restrictive
covenant when defendant employees services were held to be of a "special,
unique and extraordinary" nature to plaintiff corporation); Giller v. Harcourt
Brace & Co., 166 Misc. 2d 599, 601, 634 N.Y.S2d 646, 648 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1995) (finding that third-year law student had formed "special, unique
and extraordinary relationships" with fellow students as plaintiff's bar review
representative
and would thus be held to restrictive covenant).
32
198 N.Y. 143,91 N.E. 516 (1910).
33 By the time of the Court of Appeals decision in McCall, the Appellate
Division, First Department, had already decided a string of "unique" employee
cases that mostly arose out of show business. Most of these cases held that the
defendant employees had not been proven to be unique and irreplaceable, see
Kessler & Co. v. Chappelle, 73 A.D. 447, 449, 77 N.Y.S. 285, 286 (Ist Dep't
1902) (denying motion to continue injunctive relief against defendant
champagne salesman noting "others occup[ied] the same relations to the firm,
and are performing similar duties" and thus salesman's "services were not
special, unique, or extraordinary"); see also Dockstader v. Reed, 121 A.D. 846,
848, 106 N.Y.S. 795, 796-97 (Ist Dep't 1907) (further citations omitted)
(denying injunctive relief against defendant minstrel troupe singer even though
singer claimed "his services were unique and ... he could not be replaced");
Hammerstein v. Mann, 137 A.D. 580, 581, 122 N.Y.S. 276, 277 (1st Dep't
1910) (reversing injunctive relief in favor of operatic impressario even though
defendant opera singer, by her own admission in employment contract, stated
that she "acknowledg[ed] [that] her vocal and dramatic abilities [were] unique"),
but several did find the performers to be unique, see Edwards v. Fitzgerald,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 16, 1895 (finding that actress had such "grace, beauty, and artistic
methods [that] she ha[d] become a special attraction") (cited in Hammerstein,
137 A.D. at 583, 122 N.Y.S at 278); see also Shubert v. Angeles, 80 A.D. 625,
625, 80 N.Y.S. 146, 147 (1st Dep't 1903) (granting injunctive relief in favor of
employer stating defendant comedienne "was employed because of her special
talent as a mimic or imitator of other actresses and [ ] actors" and "her
appear[ance] in a rival company. . . would seriously affect the plaintiffs play
and [its] receipts"); Ziegfeld v. Norworth, 140 A.D. 414, 125 N.Y.S. 504 (1st
Dep't 1910) (leading lady around whom live theatrical production had been built
and billed).
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Court of Appeals quoted a treatise on equity jurisprudence to the
effect that a cause of action warranting injunctive enforcement of a
non-competition covenant is appropriate "where.. . 'a contract

stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary services or acts
... to be rendered or done by a party having special, unique, and

extraordinary qualifications, as for example, by an eminent actor,
singer, artist, and the like."' 34
McCall was not such a case, however, and the court's denial of

defendant's demurrer did not turn on his alleged status as a unique
employee. Rather, McCall was a trade secrets case, and the court's
recognition that the restrictive covenant could be enforced as a

matter of law was based on the potential unfair competition
engendered by the defendant's potential use of plaintiffs trade

secrets."

Although the court of appeals decision did not say so

explicitly, the decision below in the appellate division expressly
stated that McCall was a trade secrets case and not a unique

employee case.

In distinguishing its earlier unique employee

cases, the First Department held:
In all of these cases, however, the complaint has proceeded upon
the claim that the defendant's services to the plaintiff were so
special, unique, and extraordinary that his place could not be
filled, and, hence, that the plaintiff, if deprived of such services,
would lose the benefit of his contract of employment. In the
present case, the plaintiff does not rest his prayer for relief upon
this ground, but upon the ground that by entering the employ of a
competitor, in violation of his agreement, defendant threatens to
injure plaintiff by building up a competing business upon the
foundation of the special knowledge and skill acquired during his
employment by the plaintiff. This position is based, not upon the
claim that defendant's services to plaintiff were special, unique,
and extraordinary (although that fact is alleged), because it is not
denied that defendant's place can be filled, but upon the
proposition that defendant's qualifications for injuring plaintiff by
34 McCall,

198 N.Y. at 155, 91 N.E. at 519 (quoting Johnston Co. v. Hunt, 21
N.Y.S. 314, 315 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1892) (further citations omitted)
(quoting 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1343 (2nd ed. 1892)).
3'Id. at 151, 91 N.E. at 518 (enforcing restrictive covenant that prevented an
employee "who had entered the employment and learned the business of an
employer from carrying the benefit of the information and trade secrets thus
acquired into the employment and maintenance of a competing business.").
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advancing the interests of a competitor are special, unique, and
extraordinary.36

Thus, the unique employee rationale entered court of appeals
jurisprudence in a case in which the plaintiffs allegation that the
employee was unique was not a factor in either of the appellate
decisions. Rather, the case turned entirely on the employee's
possession and potential misuse of the plaintiffs trade secrets,"
and the passage in the court of appeals decision concerning unique
employees, which has been carried down to this day, was included
only to distinguish the unique employee cases while the court
permitted the claim to go forward on trade secrets grounds.
The next time the court of appeals considered the subject, in
1923, it flatly stated that "equity will not enforce [restrictive
covenants] specifically except to protect plaintiffs trade secrets.""
In that case and since, the court has always dismissed the unique
employee rationale as applied to the facts of each particular case
presented.39 Distinguishing its own holding in McCall and a
decision of an Oregon court,4" the court simply stated that:
36 McCall

Co. v. Wright, 133 A.D. 62, 66, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 778 (ist Dep't

1909).

17McCall, 198

N.Y. 143, 156, 91 N.E. 512, 520 (noting that the question in a
case such as this is whether "the services are of such a unique, special and
extraordinary
character to warrant an injunction.").
38 Kaumagraph
Co. v. Stampagraph Co., Inc., 235 N.Y. 1, 9, 138 N.E. 485,
488 (1923); see also Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 321,
140 N.E. 708, 712 (1923) (citing Magnolia Metal Co. v. Price, 65 A.D. 276,
279, 72 N.Y.S. 792, 795 (1st Dep't 1901) (noting "where a court has enforced a
negative covenant by an employee not to work for a long period of time... the
element
of trade secrets or unfair dealing has been controlling and important.").
39 Kaumagraph,
235 N.Y. at 9, 138 N.E. at 488 (denying equitable relief
noting "[tlhe surrender for an unlimited time of the right to use the skill,
knowledge, and experience which a workman brings to the services of his
employer as a condition of such employment has never been enforced by
injunction."); see also Clark Paper, 236 N.Y. at 321, 140 N.E. at 712 (noting
"[e]ach case must depend upon its own facts and circumstances."); Frederick
Bros. Artists Corp. v. Yates, 296 N.Y. 820, 72 N.E.2d 13 (1947); Purchasing
Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600
(1963); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 308, 353
N.E.2d 590, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976); American Broadcasting Cos.,
Inc. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 403, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486
(1981).
40Cort v. Lassard, 22 P. 1054 (Or. 1889).
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While his services were valuable and his withdrawal injurious to
plaintiff's interests, such services are not found to be so peculiar or
distinctive as to be indispensable, and the preventive remedy of
injunction will not be applied to prevent a breach of contract on
the ground that the services contracted for were special, unique,
and extraordinary."
The court has consistently applied this approach since,
repeatedly distinguishing the unique employee rationale on the
facts, and hewing to the position that:
In the cases where a court has enforced a negative covenant by an
employee not to work for another for a long period of time and
about the nature of whose work there is nothing special or
particularly valuable, the element of trade secrets or unfair dealing
has been controlling and important
Thus, even though the court of appeals has never applied the
unique employee rationale, its persistent appearance in the court's
non-compete decisions - albeit as dicta - has given that rationale
the appearance of vibrancy, and plaintiffs' lawyers have seized on
it to present courts with additional, though redundant or even
irrelevant, grounds for enforcing non-competes. 3 As a result, the
rationale for finding an employee unique for non-compete

purposes has gotten lost over the years, making possible a decision
that a television executive is a unique employee.
Talent or Experience: What Makes an Employee Unique?
Recall that the unique employee rationale emerged in New York

from cases concerning show business personnel.'

It then made its

court of appeals debut in 1910 when the court, distinguishing prior
41

Kaumagraph,235 N.Y. at 9, 138 N.E. at 488 (further citations omitted).
Clark Paper,236 N.Y. at 321, 140 N.E. at 711; see also Frederick Bros.
Artists Corp., 296 N.Y. 820, 72 N.E.2d 13; PurchasingAssocs., 13 N.Y.2d 267.
196 N.E.2d 245, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600; Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d at 308, 353 N.E.2d at
593, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 680; American BroadcastingCos., 52 N.Y.2d at 403, 420
N.E.2d at 367,438 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
4"See Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc., 166 Misc. 2d 481, 633
N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995), aftd, 223 A.D.2d 516, 637
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1996).
44See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42
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appellate division unique employee cases in deciding a trade
secrets case, quoted a treatise to the effect that, as a matter of law,
a restrictive covenant could be enforced against "a party having
special, unique, and extraordinary qualifications, as for example,
by an eminent actor, singer, artist, and the like."45 Thereafter, in
four different cases through 1976, the court repeatedly rejected the
notion that businesspeople were unique employees.46
In 1981, seventy-one years after the McCall case, the court
revisited the uniqueness rationale in connection with ABC's claim
that sportscaster Warner Wolf breached a good-faith negotiation
provision of an expired employment agreement.47 In surveying the
law governing specific performance of restrictive covenants in
employment agreements, the Wo/f court recognized that the policy
underlying enforcement of non-competes is to protect employers
against certain specific forms of unfair competition, not simply to
lend the imprimatur of state authority to employers' economically
understandable, though legally tenuous, desires to retain the
services of particularly talented or skilled employees. 8
Thus, in Wolf, tle court recognized that non-competes may be
enforced if "necessary to protect the trade secrets, customer lists or
good will of the employer's business."49 But the Wo/f court made
no definitive commitment to the unique employee rationale. It
noted only in conditional language that noncompetes "may" be
enforceable during the term of an employment agreement "perhaps
when that employer is exposed to special harm because of the
unique nature of the employee's services."5
The court also
cautioned that "no New York case has been found where
enforcement has been granted, following termination of the
employment contract, solely on the basis of the uniqueness of the
services,"'" an historical lesson that may have left the door open to
45

McCall Co. v. Wright, 198 N.Y. 143, 155, 91 N.E. 516, 519 (1910).
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
47American Broadcasting Cos., 52 N.Y.2d at 397, 420 N.E.2d at 364, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 483.
4S1d. at 404-05, 420 N.E.2d at 368, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
49
1d. at 403, 420 N.E.2d at 367, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
46

5°Id

(emphasis added) (citing Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 40

N.Y.2d 303, 308, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976) (further
citations omitted)).
5
Id. at 403 n.6, 420 N.E.2d at 367 n.6., 438 N.Y.S.2d at 486 n.6.
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holding that, at least during the term of an employment agreement,
uniqueness alone might be enough to support an injunction.
Based in large measure on that highly conditional dictum in
Wolf,52 the unique employee rationale lives on. In finding Richard
Cronin to be a unique employee who could be restrained from
competing with MTVN at least for the remaining term of his
employment agreement, 3 Justice Cahn cited his own decision in
Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc.,' which in turn relied on
Justice Ira Gammerman's unreported decision in Harlow Meyer
Savage, Inc. v. Saez."
In both cases, Harlow Meyer Savage, a brokerage firm,
successfully argued that "plaintiffs are unique employees because
they have developed relationships with clients over the course of
their terms of employment... largely at [the company's] expense
and encouragement." 56 Because New York, unlike most other
states,57 does not ordinarily recognize customer relationships as an
interest that can be protected by a restrictive covenant, these cases
appear to be using the unique employee rationale as a backdoor
way to justify the protection of customer goodwill.
Thus, the unique employee rationale has come full circle.
Originally intended to apply narrowly to unique talents, especially
in the show business world, and not to apply more broadly to
business people and the knowledge and contacts they develop on
the job, commercial division judges in Manhattan, at least, are now
accepting a business person's possession of an employer's
customer relationships and confidential trade secret information as
proof of the employee's uniqueness.58
So, while the unique employee rationale may appear to be
breathing new life, it has in fact ceased to exist as an independent
rationale for specifically enforcing a contractual covenant not to
compete. In cases brought against departing business employees,
52

id.

53 MTV

Networks, Inc. v. Fox Kids Worldwide, Inc., 1998 WL 57480, at *6
(Su.. Ct. New York County Feb. 4, 1998).
166 Misc. 2d 481, 633 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995),
afid,
223 A.D.2d 516, 637 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1996).
55
No. 95-101852 (Sup. Ct. New York County Feb. 27, 1995).
56 Maltby,
166 Misc. 2d at 484, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
57Id at 486, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
5SSee Maltby, 166 Misc. 2d at 481, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
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those covenants are enforced when necessary to protect trade
secrets, confidential customer lists and, in certain cases, customer
relations as well. 9 The uniqueness rationale is but a vestige, an
alternative linguistic formulation perhaps, with no apparent
doctrinal significance. The unique employee rationale may, of
course, still govern disputes concerning artistic talent whose
uniqueness derives not from trade secrets or customer relations
developed on the job but from individual creativity and ingenuity
for which the employer bargained.
We believe that it was for this reason, the original reason the
unique employee rationale entered New York's common law, that
the Wolf court recognized the possibility that in certain
circumstances the unique employee rationale might remain
independently viable during the term of an employee's contract."0
But that is a very different setting from a business dispute over an
executive like Richard Cronin, whose value derives from his
experience, knowledge and contacts on the job, which can be
adequately protected by restrictive covenants targeted to and
enforced because of potential unfair competition resulting from
misuse of trade secrets or confidential customer lists.
Conclusion
Non-Compete Law Should Focus on the Employer's
Legitimate Interests, Not the Employee's Uniqueness
In non-compete cases involving businesspeople, the harm to the
employer should be measured by the risk that the departing
employee will engage in unfair competition by misusing
confidential, trade secret information or customer lists belonging to
the employer, not whether that employee is "unique," whatever
that may mean. Application of the unique employee rationale in
business disputes is not sound public policy, and the paucity of
decisions enforcing a restrictive covenant on unique employee
grounds shows that judges, and perhaps lawyers, know it.
'9id.

at 484, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 929.

60American

Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 402, 420

N.E.2d 363, 367, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482,486 (1981).
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It is time for the courts to leave this vestigial dictum behind, and
focus instead on reasonably balancing the proof of risk to the
employer's trade secrets and confidential customer lists that noncompete law legitimately protects against the showing of hardship
that would be imposed on the employee by enforcing a noncompete.
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